d grounds remained relevant at all stages of the pre-trial investigation and the trial. The nature of the charges against the applicant was indicative of the applicant's personality. It suggested that he had ongoing ties with criminally-oriented individuals. Besides, the applicant was single and had no children; his mother's advanced age and poor health had not hindered him from leaving the town for contract military service or to go into hiding after the arrests of his co-defendants. The Government further stressed that the complexity of the case itself, involving seven co-defendants facing serious charges, necessitating questioning of over thirty victims and over seventy witnesses and carrying out seventeen expert evaluations, lengthened the criminal proceedings and had required the applicant's detention to be extended. The Government concluded that the period of the applicant's detention had not exceeded a reasonable time and had been founded on "relevant and sufficient" reasons.
41. The applicant agreed that at the initial stages of the proceedings his detention had been justified by the gravity of the charges he had been facing. However, with the passage of time this ground became less relevant, and the domestic authorities were under an obligation to demonstrate the existence of specific facts in support of their conclusion that he might abscond or otherwise obstruct justice. Relying on his "presumption of innocence", the applicant objected to the Government's argument that the nature of the charges against him could have been indicative of his personality for the purposes of determining the issue of his detention. The applicant further submitted that apart from the reference to the gravity of the charges and sometimes a bald reference to his character the domestic authorities had never relied on or taken into consideration any other grounds mentioned by the Government in their observations. At the same time, the applicant indicated that he had no previous criminal record, he had a permanent residence and employment in Kaluga, had taken part in peacekeeping military operations in the Northern Caucasus, his mother was seriously ill, he had no international passport and therefore could not leave Russia, and he had positive references from the places of his residence, work and military service. The applicant further objected to the Government's assertion that he had strong connections with criminally-oriented individuals. In particular, the applicant referred to the wording of his sentence, which contains no mention whatsoever of his involvement in any criminal group. The Government's assertion that he had left the town following the arrests of his co-defendants was also factually untrue and groundless.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
42. The Court reiterates that, in determining the length of detention pending trial under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the period to be taken into consideration begins on the day the accused is taken into custody and ends on the day when the charge is determined, even if only by a court of first instance (see Panchenko v. Russia, No. 45100/98, § 91, 8 February 2005; Klyakhin v. Russia, No. 46082/99, § 57, 30 November 2004; and Labita v. Italy [GC], No. 26772/95, §§ 145 and 147, ECHR 2000-IV).
43. The persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention. However after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were "relevant" and "sufficient", the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed "special diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings (see Labita,
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