cited above, §§ 152 and 153).
44. The presumption is in favour of release. As the Court has consistently held, the second limb of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until his conviction, the accused must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continued detention ceases to be reasonable. A person charged with an offence must always be released pending trial unless the State can show that there are "relevant and sufficient" reasons to justify the continued detention (see, among other authorities, Castravet v. Moldova, No. 23393/05, §§ 30 and 32, 13 March 2007; McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 543/03, § 41, ECHR 2006-...; {Jablonski} v. Poland, No. 33492/96, § 83, 21 December 2000; and Neumeister v. Austria, 27 June 1968, § 4, Series A No. 8). Article 5 § 3 of the Convention cannot be seen as unconditionally authorising detention provided that it lasts no longer than a certain period. Justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities (see Shishkov v. Bulgaria, No. 38822/97, § 66, ECHR 2003-I (extracts)).
45. It is incumbent on the domestic authorities to establish the existence of specific facts relevant to the grounds for continued detention. Shifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the Convention, a provision which makes detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty and one that is only permissible in exhaustively enumerated and strictly defined cases (see Rokhlina v. Russia, No. 54071/00, § 67, 7 April 2005, and Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, No. 33977/96, §§ 84 and 85, 26 July 2001). The national judicial authorities must examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty, and must set them out in their decisions dismissing the applications for release. It is not the Court's task to establish such facts and take the place of the national authorities who ruled on the applicant's detention. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in the domestic courts' decisions and of the true facts mentioned by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Korchuganova v. Russia, No. 75039/01, § 72, 8 June 2006; Ilijkov, cited above, § 86; and Labita, cited above, § 152).
(b) Application to the present case
(i) Period to be taken into consideration
46. The applicant was arrested on 8 November 2000 and was held in custody until his conviction by the first-instance court on 4 December 2003. The period to be taken into consideration therefore lasted three years and twenty-six days.
(ii) The reasonableness of the length of detention
47. It is not disputed by the parties that the applicant's detention was initially warranted by a reasonable suspicion of his involvement in the commission of a murder. In the decision of 4 November 2000 the prosecutor cited the gravity of the charges and the need to prevent the applicant from absconding and obstructing justice as the grounds for placing him in custody (see paragraph 6 above). At that stage of the proceedings those reasons were sufficient to justify keeping the applicant in custody (see Khudoyorov v. Russia, No. 6847/02, § 176, ECHR 2005-X (extracts)).
48. However, with the passage of time those grounds inevitably became less and less relevant. Accordingly, the authorities were under an obligation to analyse the
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