nted out that he had been locked in a room for nine hours and during that period had only been permitted to go to the toilet once, under guard. At all other times until his departure he had been under the constant escort and supervision of a border guard. He submitted that his detention had failed to meet the standard of "lawfulness" because it had been governed by the unpublished Border Crossing Guidelines, which were not "accessible" regardless of formal compliance with them. Since he had not been detained in connection with any administrative or criminal procedure, he had had no procedural protection allowing him to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed, as required by paragraph 4 of Article 5. Any ex post facto review would not have allowed him to secure an order for his release as required by Article 5 § 4. Lastly, he maintained that, since the courts had held that the border officials' actions had not constituted a breach of Russian law or Article 5, he had no enforceable right to compensation, as required by Article 5 § 5.
92. The Government denied that the applicant had ever been "detained" because he had not been "arrested in procedural terms" and because no formal "detention measures" had been taken. Rather, the applicant had not been permitted to cross the Russian border and had been offered the possibility of staying in the transit hall of the airport, where he could use the bar and telephone. Accordingly, the Government considered that Article 5 of the Convention was not applicable in the present case. In any event, they claimed that the applicant had been able to lodge an application for judicial review of his alleged detention with the Moscow Regional Court, which had satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 4.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Existence of a deprivation of liberty
93. The parties disagreed on the issue of whether or not the applicant was deprived of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention. The Court reiterates that in proclaiming the right to liberty, paragraph 1 of Article 5 contemplates the physical liberty of the person; its aim is to ensure that no one should be deprived of that liberty in an arbitrary fashion. In order to determine whether someone has been "deprived of his liberty" within the meaning of Article 5, the starting-point must be his concrete situation, and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question. The difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance (see Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, § 42, Reports 1996-III).
94. On the facts, the Court observes that the applicant arrived at the Moscow airport from Cyprus at 11 p.m. on 2 June 2002. After the border control had refused him leave to enter Russian territory, he was escorted to the transit hall. In the transit hall he was locked up overnight in a small room. He was allowed to use the toilet, bar and telephone in the morning on the following day. At about 10 a.m. he bought a ticket to Tallinn and boarded that flight one and a half hours later. He was accompanied by a border guard until such time as he was on board.
95. Even though the applicant had not crossed the Russian border, as the Government pointed out, during his stay in the transit hall he was under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The Government did not claim that the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport had the status of extraterritoriality or was otherwise outside the State's control (compare Shamsa v. Poland, Nos. 45355/99 and 45357/99, § 45, 27 November 2003). The Court finds therefore that the applicant was effectively under Russian authority and responsibility (compare {Ocalan} v. Turkey [GC], No. 46221/99, § 91, ECHR 2005-IV).
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