evidentiary value of the documents submitted to it (see {Celikbilek} v. Turkey, No. 27693/95, § 71, 31 May 2005).
90. The Court considers it very unlikely that several military vehicles stolen by insurgents from the federal troops in the 1990s could have moved freely through Russian military checkpoints without being noticed. It thus finds that the fact that a large group of armed men in uniform travelling in the APC and IBV arrived in the village of Akhkinchu-Borzoy at 6 a.m. on 22 November 2002 strongly supports the applicants' assertion that these were State servicemen conducting a security operation.
91. The domestic investigation also accepted factual assumptions as presented by the applicants and took steps to check whether law-enforcement agencies or the military had been involved in the kidnapping (see paragraphs 22 and 52 above).
92. The Court observes that where the applicants make out a prima facie case and the Court is prevented from reaching factual conclusions owing to a lack of documents, it is for the Government to argue conclusively why the documents in question cannot serve to corroborate the allegations made by the applicants, or to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation of how the events in question occurred. The burden of proof is thus shifted to the Government and if they fail in their arguments, issues will arise under Article 2 and/or Article 3 (see {Togcu} v. Turkey, No. 27601/95, § 95, 31 May 2005; and Akkum and Others v. Turkey, No. 21894/93, § 211, ECHR 2005-II).
93. Taking into account the above elements, the Court is satisfied that the applicants have made a prima facie case that their son was apprehended by State servicemen. The Government's statement that the investigation did not find any evidence to support the involvement of the military or law enforcers in the kidnapping is insufficient to discharge them from the above-mentioned burden of proof. Drawing inferences from the Government's failure to submit the documents which were in their exclusive possession or to provide another plausible explanation of the events in question, the Court considers that Marvan Idalov was apprehended on 22 November 2002 by State servicemen during an unacknowledged security operation.
94. There has been no reliable news of Marvan Idalov since the date of the kidnapping. His name has not been found in any official detention facilities' records. Lastly, the Government did not submit any explanation as to what had happened to him after his arrest.
95. Having regard to the previous cases concerning disappearances of persons in the Chechen Republic which have come before the Court (see, among others, Imakayeva, cited above; Luluyev and Others v. Russia, No. 69480/01, ECHR 2006-XIII; Baysayeva v. Russia, No. 74237/01, 5 April 2007; Akhmadova and Sadulayeva v. Russia, cited above; and Alikhadzhiyeva v. Russia, No. 68007/01, 5 July 2007), the Court considers that, in the context of the conflict in the Chechen Republic, when a person is detained by unidentified servicemen without any subsequent acknowledgement of the detention, this can be regarded as life-threatening. The absence of Marvan Idalov or any news of him for almost seven years supports this assumption.
96. Accordingly, the Court finds that the evidence available permits it to establish that Marvan Idalov must be presumed dead following his unacknowledged detention by State servicemen.
V. Alleged violation of Article 2 of the Convention
97. The applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention that their relative had disappeared after having been detained by Russian servicemen and that the domestic authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation of the matter. Article 2 reads:
"1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally s
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