icles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny (see, mutatis mutandis, Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, § 32, Series A No. 336; and {Avsar}, cited above, § 283) even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already taken place.
83. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, such as in cases where persons are under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Tomasi v. France, 27 August 1992, §§ 108 - 11, Series A No. 241-A; Ribitsch, cited above, § 34; and Selmouni v. France [GC], No. 25803/94, § 87, ECHR 1999-V).
84. These principles apply also to cases in which, although it has not been proved that a person has been taken into custody by the authorities, it is possible to establish that he or she entered a place under their control and has not been seen since. In such circumstances, the onus is on the Government to provide a plausible explanation of what happened on the premises and to show that the person concerned was not detained by the authorities, but left the premises without subsequently being deprived of his or her liberty (see {Tanis} and Others, cited above, § 160).
85. Lastly, when there have been criminal proceedings in the domestic courts concerning those same allegations, it must be borne in mind that criminal-law liability is distinct from international-law responsibility under the Convention. The Court's competence is confined to the latter. Responsibility under the Convention is based on its own provisions, which are to be interpreted and applied on the basis of the objectives of the Convention and in the light of the relevant principles of international law. The responsibility of a State under the Convention, for the acts of its organs, agents and servants, is not to be confused with the domestic legal issues of individual criminal responsibility under examination in the national criminal courts. The Court is not concerned with reaching any findings as to guilt or innocence in that sense (see {Avsar}, cited above, § 284).
2. Establishment of the facts
86. The Court notes that despite its requests for a copy of the file on the investigation into the abduction of Marvan Idalov, the Government produced only a small part of the documents from the case file. The Government referred to Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court observes that in previous cases it has already found this explanation insufficient to justify the withholding of key information requested by the Court (see Imakayeva v. Russia, No. 7615/02, § 123, ECHR 2006-XIII).
87. In view of this, and bearing in mind the principles referred to above, the Court finds that it can draw inferences from the Government's conduct in respect of the well-foundedness of the applicants' allegations. The Court will thus proceed to examine crucial elements in the present case that should be taken into account when deciding whether the applicants' son can be presumed dead and whether his death can be attributed to the authorities.
88. The applicants alleged that the persons who had taken Marvan Idalov away on 22 November 2002 had been State agents.
89. The Government suggested in their submission that the persons who had detained Marvan Idalov could have been insurgents wishing to recruit the young man to an illegal armed group. However, this allegation was not specific and they did not submit any material to support it. The Court would stress in this regard that the evaluation of the evidence and the establishment of the facts is a matter for the Court, and it is incumbent on it to decide on the
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