w proceedings had never met, or otherwise communicated with, the applicant in advance of the hearing. Her opportunity of discussing the case with her client was limited to a short communication by video link which took place within the same telecommunication session as the appeal hearing itself. The Court considers that the timing of Ms A.'s appointment made it difficult, if not impossible, to agree with the applicant on the line of defence she would pursue at the hearing.
50. The Court also notes that by a separate decision on the preliminary point of procedure the Supreme Court decided that it would not accept a new statement of appeal from the applicant and would consider his position on the basis of the submissions made by his former counsel, Ms P., before the previous appeal hearing in 2002. The Court considers that the lack of personal contact with the applicant at the hearing and the absence of any discussion with him in advance of the hearing, combined with the fact that she had to plead the case on the basis of the points of appeal lodged five years earlier by another lawyer, reduced Ms A.'s appearance at the appeal hearing to a mere formality.
51. The Court further notes that the applicant's dissatisfaction with the manner in which his legal assistance was organised was made sufficiently clear to the Supreme Court. Unlike the latter, the Court considers that the reasons given by the applicant for his refusal to be assisted by Ms A. were legitimate and justified in the circumstances. Consequently, his conduct did not relieve the authorities of their obligation to take further steps to guarantee the effectiveness of his defence.
52. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the Supreme Court failed to ensure the applicant's effective legal representation in the appeal hearing that took place on 29 November 2007, as it had in the earlier proceedings.
53. In sum, the Court finds that the measures taken by the authorities failed to provide appropriate redress for the applicant. He may therefore still claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. The Court therefore rejects the Government's objections under this head and finds that there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.
54. As regards the complaint concerning the conduct of the appeal hearing by video link, the Court notes that the exercise of the right to legal assistance takes on particular significance where the applicant communicates with the courtroom by video link (see case-law cited in paragraph 43). Given the overlap between the two complaints, and in view of the finding above that the applicant did not receive adequate legal assistance at the appeal hearing, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine separately the question whether in the circumstance of this case the applicant's participation in the appeal hearing by video link complied with Article 6.
II. Other alleged violations of the Convention
55. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 5 alleging unlawfulness of his pre-trial detention. He also complained under Article 6 about the late notification about the expert appointments, the allegedly wrong assessment of evidence and about the outcome of the trial. Finally, he complained under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 that he had been denied a right to appeal.
56. In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. Application of Article 4
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