ued that none of his injuries had been self-inflicted and that the Government had not presented any evidence to the contrary. He noted that the Government, alleging that he had signed an entry in the registration log on 8 August 2001, had produced an extract handwritten by a warder. The extract did not bear the applicant's signature. He further noted that he had not been attacked by Ms D. and Mr Me. He also disputed the Government's arguments that he could have sustained certain injuries between 9 and 12 August 2001. The applicant argued that during that period he had been in custody in the hands of the police and that the Government had not provided any plausible explanation as to the cause of his injuries during that period.
36. The applicant insisted that he had consistently complained about the beatings whenever he had been able to do it freely: to the medical emergency team, to the hospital doctors, prosecutors and domestic courts. He relied on the conclusions made by the medical expert on 13 August 2001 that his injuries could have been caused by a firm blunt elongated object. He pointed out that such a description corresponds to the description of a rubber truncheon used by the police officers during the beatings. The applicant further noted that his complaints of ill-treatment to the domestic authorities were futile and his requests for an additional forensic medical examination had gone unanswered.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Admissibility
37. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
(a) General principles
38. As the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct (see Labita v. Italy [GC], No. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV, and Chahal v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V, p. 1855, § 79). Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 of the Convention even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Selmouni v. France [GC], No. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999-V, and Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII, p. 3288, § 93).
39. The Court has consistently stressed that the suffering and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. Measures depriving a person of his liberty may often involve such an element. In accordance with Article 3 of the Convention the State must ensure that a person is detained under conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity and that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see {Kudla} v. Poland [GC], No. 30210/96, §§ 92 - 94, ECHR 2000-XI).
40. In the context of detainees, the Court has emphasised that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect their physical well-being (see Tarariyeva v. Russia, No. 4353/03, § 73, ECHR 2006-... (extracts); Sarban v. Moldova, No. 3456/05, § 77, 4 October 2005; and Mouisel v. France, No. 67263/01, § 40, ECHR 2002-IX). In respect of a person deprived of his liberty, any recourse to physical force which has
> 1 2 3 ... 6 7 8 ... 13 14 15
Zaki.ru законы и право
поиск по сайту
каталог документов
добавить сайт Zaki.ru в избранное
Правовые акты международные
Правовые акты Российской Федерации
