spend those sentences in respect of four of the officers. The only reason for reducing the sentences was the fact that the police officers had been awarded medals for excellent police service and had positive references from their superiors (see paragraph 75 above). The Court, however, cannot accept those arguments as justifying imposition of lenient sentences on the police officers, who had been found guilty of a particularly serious case of prolonged torture, causing severe and irreparable damage to the applicant's health. The sentences imposed on the police officers must therefore be regarded as manifestly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by them. By punishing the officers with lenient sentences more than seven years after their wrongful conduct, the State in effect fostered the law-enforcement officers' "sense of impunity" instead of showing, as it should have done, that such acts could in no way be tolerated (see, for similar reasoning, {Gafgen}, cited above, §§ 123 and 124; Atalay, cited above, §§ 40 to 44; {Okkali}, cited above, §§ 73 to 75; and Nikolova and Velichkova, cited above, §§ 60 to 63).
142. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the authorities failed to carry out an effective criminal investigation into the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment.
(ii) Adequacy of the compensation
143. The Court reiterates that the question whether the applicant received compensation - comparable to just satisfaction as provided for under Article 41 of the Convention - for the damage caused by the treatment contrary to Article 3 is an important indicator for assessing whether the breach of the Convention was redressed (see Shilbergs v. Russia, No. 20075/03, § 72, 17 December 2009, and, mutatis mutandis, {Gafgen}, cited above, §§ 126 and 127).
144. The Court has already found that an applicant's victim status may depend on the level of compensation awarded at domestic level on the basis of the facts about which he or she complains before the Court. With regard to pecuniary damage, the domestic courts are clearly in a better position to determine its existence and quantum. Regarding non-pecuniary damage, the Court must exercise supervision to verify whether the sums awarded are not unreasonable in comparison with the awards made by the Court in similar cases. Whether the amount awarded may be regarded as reasonable falls to be assessed in the light of all the circumstances of the case. The Court has accepted that it might be easier for the domestic courts to refer to the amounts awarded at domestic level, especially in cases concerning personal injury, damage relating to a relative's death or damage in defamation cases, for example, and rely on their innermost conviction, even if that results in awards of amounts that are somewhat lower than those fixed by the Court in similar cases. However, where the amount of compensation is substantially lower than what the Court generally awards in comparable cases, the applicant retains his status as a "victim" of the alleged breach of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) [GC], No. 36813/97, §§ 182 - 192 and 202 - 215, ECHR 2006-V).
145. In the present case the applicant was awarded about EUR 16 in medical costs. Although this sum appears to be low, it can be seen from the domestic judgment that the amount of compensation in respect of pecuniary damage was determined on the basis of the documents submitted by the applicant in support of his claim. The remainder of the claim was rejected as unsubstantiated (see paragraph 77 above). The Court has no reason to question that finding. The applicant did not produce any evidence that might lead the Court to consider that the amount awarded was arbitrary or irreconcilable with the available supporting documents or receipts. The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicant received compensation in respect of
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