ant had waived his right to ask S. questions. Moreover, all reasonable efforts had been made to secure S.'s presence at the trial. A subsequent suspension of the trial proceedings would have impinged upon the accused's rights, in particular their right to a trial within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the trial court had been justified in allowing the reading-out of S.'s pre-trial statement. The reading-out had been lawful.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
65. The Court reiterates that all the evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing, in the presence of the accused, with a view to adversarial argument. There are exceptions to this principle, but they must not infringe the rights of the defence. As a general rule, paragraphs 1 and 3 (d) of Article 6 require that the defendant be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, either when he makes his statements or at a later stage (see Van Mechelen and Others v. the Netherlands, 23 April 1997, § 51, Reports 1997-III, {Ludi} v. Switzerland, 15 June 1992, § 49, Series A No. 238). Indeed, as the Court has stated on a number of occasions (see, among other authorities, {Ludi}, cited above, § 47), it may prove necessary in certain circumstances to refer to statements made during the investigative stage. If the defendant has been given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge the statements, their admission in evidence will not in itself contravene Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention (see, for instance, Belevitskiy v. Russia, No. 72967/01, § 117, 1 March 2007). The corollary of that, however, is that where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on statements that have been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined at some stage of the proceedings, the rights of the defence are restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6 (see Unterpertinger v. Austria, 24 November 1986, §§ 31 - 33, Series A No. 110; {Saidi} v. France 20 September 1993, §§ 43 - 44, Series A No. 261-C; {Luca} v. Italy, No. 33354/96, § 40, ECHR 2001-II; and Solakov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, No. 47023/99, § 57, ECHR 2001-X).
66. The Court also reiterates that where a deposition may serve to a material degree as the basis for a conviction then, irrespective of whether it was made by a witness in the strict sense or by a co-accused, it constitutes evidence for the prosecution to which the guarantees provided by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention apply (see {Luca}, cited above, § 41). In the event that the impossibility of examining the witnesses or having them examined is due to the fact that they are absent or otherwise missing, the authorities must make a reasonable effort to secure their presence (see Bonev v. Bulgaria, No. 60018/00, § 43, 8 June 2006). The Court also considers that while the appearance of a witness is a prerequisite for the defence's opportunities to confront this witness, there must also be an adequate opportunity to question him or her (see Kaste and Mathisen v. Norway, Nos. 18885/04 and 21166/04, § 47, ECHR 2006-...).
67. The Court considered in {Isgro} v. Italy (19 February 1991, § 35, Series A No. 194-A) that the confrontation procedure in that case had enabled the applicant to put questions directly to a key witness and to discuss his statements, thus providing the investigating judge with all the information which was capable of casting doubt on the witness's credibility. Mr {Isgro} had also been able to repeat in person his claims before the first-instance and appeal courts. Despite the fact that Mr {Isgro} had not been represented during the confrontation in question, the Court noted that the public prosecutor had likewise been absent, and that the purpose of the confrontation did n
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