s the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in which the offence charged will be considered at the trial (Can v. Austria, No. 9300/81, Commission report of 12 July 1984, § 50, Series A No. 96, and, more recently, Salduz v. Turkey [GC], No. 36391/02, § 54, 27 November 2008). At the same time, an accused often finds himself in a particularly vulnerable position at that stage of the proceedings, the effect of which is amplified by the fact that legislation on criminal procedure tends to become increasingly complex, notably with respect to the rules governing the gathering and use of evidence. In most cases, this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer (see Salduz, cited above, § 54). Thus, it is unlikely that in the absence of legal advice the applicant was in a position to understand the confrontation procedure and effectively exercise his right to examine a "witness" with a view to casting doubt on the authenticity and credibility of S.'s incriminating statement. The Court is not prepared to consider that the applicant validly waived his right to examine S.
80. Moreover, the Court notes that the confrontation was conducted by an investigator who did not meet the requirements of independence and impartiality, and had a large discretionary power to block questions during the confrontation.
81. In view of the above, the pre-trial confrontation procedure in the present case was not an appropriate substitute for the examination of the co-accused in open court (see, mutatis mutandis, Windisch v. Austria, 27 September 1990, § 28, Series A No. 186). S.'s presence was of crucial importance to enable the court to make an effective assessment of his demeanour and of the reliability of his deposition (see Hulki {Gunes} v. Turkey, No. 28490/95, § 92, ECHR 2003-VII (extracts); Vladimir Romanov, cited above, § 105; and Makeyev v. Russia, No. 13769/04, §§ 41 - 42 and 45, 5 February 2009).
82. Lastly, the Court notes that the respondent Government failed to show that every reasonable effort had been made in order to bring S. before the trial court. In particular, it does not appear that any measures were taken after an arrest warrant had been issued against S. Nor does it appear that when instructing the trial judge to resume the trial the court of appeal enquired whether the requisite measures had indeed been taken. While the Court is mindful of the difficulties encountered by the authorities in terms of resources, it has no reason to consider that tracking down S. for the purpose of calling him at the trial, in which the applicant stood accused of a serious offence and faced a custodial sentence, would have constituted an insuperable obstacle (see Bonev, cited above, § 44, with further references).
83. Although the Court does not doubt that the domestic courts undertook a careful examination of S.'s pre-trial deposition, it finds that the defence rights were in the circumstances restricted to an extent that was incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6.
84. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention.
III. Alleged violation of Article 34 of the Convention
85. The applicant complained that the prison authorities had acted in breach of his right of individual petition under Article 34 of the Convention which, in its relevant parts, reads as follows:
"The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right."
A. Submissions by the parties
86. The applicant raised three s
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