a court as she had still had legitimate expectation that her action would be examined by the competent judicial authority.
24. In this connection, the Court reiterates that on 13 August 2002 the Sverdlovskiy District Court transferred the applicant's case to the Commercial Court for examination on the merits. The transfer was made with the applicant's consent. At the same time the District Court noted that should the applicant refuse the transfer, the proceedings in her case would be discontinued (see paragraph 8 above).
25. The Court observes that the decision to transfer the applicant's action to the Commercial Court was based on the District Court's assessment of the procedural rules governing the subject matter over which it had jurisdiction. The Court subscribes to the general assumption that domestic courts are better schooled in and more able to interpret complex and rather technical legal rules defining the jurisdictional limits of their judicial power. In such a situation it is not surprising that the applicant did not lodge an appeal against the decision of 13 August 2002, seeing no reason to doubt the correctness of the District Court's finding and consenting to the transfer of the case, particularly so when she was faced with a dilemma: either to proceed with her action in another court or to endure the closing of the proceedings (see paragraph 8 above). In reaching this conclusion the Court attributes particular weight to the fact that the District Court grounded its decision of 13 August 2002 on interpretation of the legal act which had entered into force only a week before (see paragraph 8 above). Furthermore, the Government did not argue that the District Court's interpretation of the jurisdictional parameters of its powers had been so manifestly incorrect that it had become absolutely evident to the applicant that the transfer of her case to the Commercial Court would result in the discontinuation of the proceedings (see, for similar reasoning, Hajiyev v. Azerbaijan, No. 5548/03, § 43, 16 November 2006). In fact, the Government have never identified the court, either District or Commercial, which had the authority to examine the applicant's case.
26. In addition, the Court observes that it was not until 17 October 2002, the date on which the Commercial Court's decision on discontinuation of the proceedings was issued, that the applicant could finally foresee the consequences of her decision to consent to the transfer of the case from the District Court to the Commercial Court. However, by that time the avenue of appeal against the decision of 13 August 2002 was no longer open to her as the ten-day time-limit envisaged for institution of appeal proceedings had expired. The Court is mindful of the fact that in these circumstances the applicant still tried to avail herself of the judicial protection. She appealed against the Commercial Court's decision of 17 October 2002 to a higher-ranking court and subsequently, being unsuccessful in her appeal, challenged the latter court's decision. In these circumstances the Court finds that the applicant cannot be said to have failed to exhaust domestic remedies by not bringing a formal appeal against the decision of 13 August 2002. It follows that the complaint cannot be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
27. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
28. The Court considers firstly that the restriction on the applicant's ability to take legal proceedings must be considered from the perspective of the right of access to a court. It reiterates that Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to hi
> 1 2 3 ... 13 14 15 16 ... 17