e judgments had had to be quashed. The quashing had been legitimate, lawful, and compliant with the principle of legal certainty. The quashing was meant to ensure a uniform and coherent functioning of the State pension scheme and to protect the public purse from undue depletion.
11. The applicants argued that their applications were admissible. The quashing had been unjustified because the district and town courts did take into account the interpretation of 2005, and because the interpretation of 2007 had been given after the judgments. In any event, a legislative interpretation of laws might come only from a lawmaker, not from a court. Besides, the pension authority had missed the statutory time-limit for the quashing, and the courts had extended that limit without good reason.
12. The Court notes that the applications are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
13. The Court reiterates that for the sake of legal certainty implicitly required by Article 6, final judgments should generally be left intact. They may be disturbed only to correct fundamental defects (see Ryabykh v. Russia, No. 52854/99, §§ 51 - 52, ECHR 2003-IX). Quashing of judgments because of newly-discovered circumstances is not by itself incompatible with this requirement, but the manner of its application may be (see Pravednaya v. Russia, No. 69529/01, §§ 27 - 34, 18 November 2004).
14. In the case in hand, the domestic courts justified the quashing with the Supreme Court's two interpretations of the Law on Labour Pensions.
As to the interpretation of 2005, the Court considers that differing judicial interpretations of a law represent a ground for an ordinary appeal, rather than a discovery warranting a quashing of a binding judgment (see Yerogova v. Russia, No. 77478/01, § 34, 19 June 2008).
As to the interpretation of 2007, the Court reiterates that newly-discovered circumstances are circumstances that exist during the trial, remain hidden from the court, and become known after trial. Since the interpretation of 2007 was posterior to the Town Court's judgments, it did not justify the quashing either (see Yerogova, cited above, § 33).
15. It follows that the quashing of the applicants' judgments was unjustified, and that there has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
III. Application of Article 41 of the Convention
16. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
"If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."
A. Damage, costs, and expenses
17. In respect of pecuniary damage, the applicants claimed sums ranging from 209 euros (EUR) to EUR 9,507. According to the applicants, these sums represented the difference between the pensions they had been receiving after the quashing and the pensions they would have received in their lifetime if there had been no quashing. The Government contested the applicants' method of calculation as having no basis in domestic law. They stressed that before their quashing, the judgments had been duly enforced.
18. The Court rejects this claim in view of its speculative character (see Tarnopolskaya and Others v. Russia, Nos. 11093/07, 14558/07, 19660/07, 30166/07, 46736/07, 52681/07, 52985/07, 10633/08, 10652/08, 12694/08, 15437/08, 16691/08, 19447/07, 19457/08, 20857/08, 20872/08, 22546/08, 25820/08, 25839/08, and 25845/08, § 51, 9 July 2009).
19. I
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