the charges against him. They also stated that the applicant could abscond or interfere with the criminal proceedings, without explaining the reasons for those findings.
117. As regards the domestic authorities' reliance on the gravity of the charges as the decisive element, the Court has repeatedly held that, although the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of absconding, the need to continue the deprivation of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view, taking into consideration only the gravity of the offence. Nor can continuation of the detention be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (see Belevitskiy v. Russia, No. 72967/01, § 101, 1 March 2007; Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, No. 33977/96, § 81, 26 July 2001; and Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, § 51, Series A No. 207,). This is particularly relevant in the Russian legal system where the characterisation in law of the facts - and thus the sentence faced by the applicant - is determined by the prosecution without judicial review of the issue whether the evidence that has been obtained supports a reasonable suspicion that the applicant has committed the alleged offence (see Khudoyorov v. Russia, No. 6847/02, § 180, 8 November 2005).
118. Furthermore, it does not transpire from the domestic courts' decisions that they ever examined the applicant's personal history when deciding upon whether to extend his detention pending trial. The courts assumed that the gravity of the charges carried such a preponderant weight that no other circumstances could have warranted the applicant's release. In this connection the Court reiterates that any system of mandatory detention is incompatible per se with Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Ilijkov, cited above, § 84, with further references). It is incumbent on the domestic authorities to establish and demonstrate the existence of concrete facts outweighing the rule of respect for individual liberty. In the Court's view, the courts failed to mention any such facts in their decisions on the applicant's detention.
119. The Court has previously found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in several Russian cases where the domestic courts extended an applicant's detention relying essentially on the gravity of the charges and using stereotyped formula paraphrasing the reasons for detention provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure, without explaining how they applied in the applicant's case or considering alternative preventive measures (see Belevitskiy, Mamedova and Khudoyorov cases cited above, and also Khudobin v. Russia, No. 59696/00, §§ 103 et seq., ECHR 2006-... (extracts); Dolgova v. Russia, No. 11886/05, §§ 38 et seq., 2 March 2006; Rokhlina v. Russia, No. 54071/00, §§ 63 et seq., 7 April 2005; Panchenko v. Russia, No. 45100/98, §§ 91 et seq., 8 February 2005; and Smirnova v. Russia, nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, §§ 56 et seq., ECHR 2003-IX (extracts)).
120. Having regard to its case-law on the subject and the above considerations, the Court concludes that the domestic authorities did not adduce "relevant and sufficient" reasons to justify the applicant's detention in excess of a "reasonable time". In these circumstances it is not necessary to examine whether the proceedings were conducted with "special diligence".
121. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
IV. Alleged violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention
122. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that the domestic courts had not examined his appeals against decisions on the extension of his detention "speedily". Article 5 § 4 reads as follows:
"Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be deci
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