rnments of the proceedings in order to modify his claims. Those requests caused in total a delay of seven months (see paragraphs 9 and 19 above). The Court also notes that on one occasion the applicant failed to appear for a preparatory hearing (see paragraph 16 above), causing another delay of approximately three weeks.
30. As for the applicant's requests to adjourn the proceedings pending the criminal investigation into the road traffic accident, the Court takes note of the Government's argument that it was incumbent on the District Court to adjourn the proceedings pending the criminal investigation in the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the applicant cannot be held responsible for any delay resulting from his requests to await the completion of the criminal investigation. The Court further observes that the proceedings were adjourned on at least three occasions pending the criminal investigation, causing delays of seven and a half months, six months and one year and eight months respectively (see paragraphs 12, 14 and 17 above). Admittedly, the findings of the criminal investigation were decisive for the resolution of the civil dispute initiated by the applicant and, as the Government pointed out, the District Court had to wait for the completion of the criminal investigation. However, the Court reiterates in that connection that it is incumbent on respondent States to organise their legal systems in such a way that their courts can meet the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, including the obligation to hear cases within a reasonable time (see {Surmeli} v. Germany [GC], No. 75529/01, § 129, ECHR 2006-VII). Accordingly, the Court considers that the adjournments of the proceedings owing to the lengthy criminal investigation seriously protracted the proceedings and were attributable to the authorities.
31. Lastly, the Court notes that between 9 October 1998 and 11 March 1999 two hearings were adjourned following requests by the respondent company (1) to commission an expert report, which they subsequently failed to pay for, and (2) to study the case file, and that on one occasion its representative failed to appear. The respondent company's conduct thus caused another delay of five months in the proceedings. In the Court's opinion, it was incumbent on the District Court to discipline the defaulting party in order to ensure that the proceedings were conducted at an acceptable pace (see {Kusmierek} v. Poland, No. 10675/02, § 34, 21 September 2004). However, the judicial authorities failed to do so and the above-mentioned delay in the proceedings is also attributable to the authorities.
32. Making an overall assessment, and having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the "reasonable time" requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. Other alleged violations of the Convention
33. The applicant further complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the domestic courts had erred in their findings and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that they had not granted his claims in full.
34. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence ratione materiae, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. Application of Article 41 of the Convention
35. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
"If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Pa
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