nt to the guarantees of a fair trial. However, such a waiver must, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, be established in an unequivocal manner; it must not run counter to any important public interest (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], No. 56581/00, § 86, ECHR 2006-...), and it must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance (see Poitrimol v. France, 23 November 1993, § 31, Series A No. 277-A). Furthermore, in view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial Article 6 of the Convention imposes on every national court an obligation to check whether the defendant has had the opportunity to know of the date of the hearing and the steps to be taken in order to take part where, as in the instant case, this is disputed on a ground that does not immediately appear to be manifestly devoid of merit (see, mutatis mutandis, Somogyi v. Italy, No. 67972/01, § 72, ECHR 2004-IV, and Hermi, cited above, § 76).
47. The Court observes that no explicit waiver was made in the present case. The question is whether there was a tacit one. In order to reply to that question, the Court will have to establish in the first place, whether, as the Government submitted, the applicant and his representative were duly informed of the appeal hearing of 29 June 2006.
48. The Court observes that on 23 May 2006 the applicant was informed that "case will be heard by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation at 10 am on 29 June 2006". However, according to the applicant, by that date he was not aware that his case had been sent to a fresh appeal hearing as a result of the supervisory review and therefore, he could not know what kind of hearing would be held by the Supreme Court. The Court notes that the Government have not provided any information to prove that the applicant and/or his counsel were duly informed of the supervisory review proceedings or of their outcome. The Court further notes that on 4 November 2005 it forwarded to the applicant a copy of the Government's observations in which they submitted that on 26 October 2005 the Deputy Prosecutor had applied for a supervisory review of the appeal decision of 15 August 2002. On 23 May 2006 the Court forwarded to the applicant the Government's letter from which it followed that on 5 April 2006 the Presidium of the Supreme Court had quashed the appeal decision of 15 August 2002 and had remitted the case for a fresh appeal examination. It follows that, at least until the date on which the applicant received the Court's letter of 23 May 2006 he was not aware of the results of the supervisory review proceedings. It means that on 23 May 2006, the date on which the applicant read the telegram informing him that his case would be heard by the Supreme Court, he could not have known what hearing was to be held by the Supreme Court, a supervisory review hearing or a fresh appeal hearing. In those circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant was not duly notified of the appeal hearing of 29 June 2006. The Court also notes that the Government have not submitted any document which demonstrates that the applicant's counsel received notification.
49. Furthermore, it follows from the appeal decision of 29 June 2006 that the appeal court did not verify whether the applicant and his representative had been duly notified of the hearing. Neither did that decision state that the applicant had failed to submit a request for participation in the hearing and had waived his right, and that his failure to appear would not preclude examination of the case. In such circumstances, the Court considers that it cannot be said that in the present case the applicant had waived his right to take part in the hearing in an unequivocal manner.
50. Having regard to its findings in paragraphs 42, 48 and 49 above, the Court considers that the appeal hearing of 29 June 2006 did not comply with the requirements o
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