the principle of legal certainty, which requires, among other things, that where the courts have finally determined an issue their ruling should not be called into question (see {Brumarescu} v. Romania [GC], No. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-VII). In the specific context of supervisory review in criminal cases, the Court has previously held that this requirement is not absolute and that any decision deviating from the principle must be assessed in the light of Article 4 § 2 of Protocol No. 7, which expressly permits a State to reopen a case due to the emergence of new facts, or where a fundamental defect is detected in the previous proceedings which was capable of affecting the outcome of the case (see Nikitin v. Russia, No. 50178/99, §§ 54 - 57, ECHR 2004-VIII; Savinskiy v. Ukraine, No. 6965/02, § 23, 28 February 2006, and Xheraj v. Albania, No. 37959/02, §§ 51 - 61, 29 July 2008). A review of a final and binding judgment should not be granted merely for the purpose of obtaining a rehearing and a fresh determination of the case, but rather to correct judicial errors and miscarriages of justice.
23. The relevant considerations to be taken into account in this connection include, in particular, the effect of the reopening and any subsequent proceedings on the applicant's individual situation and whether the reopening resulted from the applicant's own request; the grounds on which the domestic authorities revoked the finality of the judgment in the applicant's case; the compliance of the procedure at issue with the requirements of the domestic law; the existence and operation of procedural safeguards in the domestic legal system capable of preventing abuses of this procedure and other pertinent circumstances of the case (see Nikitin, cited above, § 60; Bratyakin v. Russia (dec.), No. 72776/01, 9 March 2006; Fadin v. Russia, No. 58079/00, § 34, 27 July 2006; and Savinskiy, cited above, §§ 24 - 26). Furthermore, proceedings before the supervisory-review court should afford the procedural safeguards of Article 6 § 1 and must ensure the overall fairness of the proceedings (see Vanyan v. Russia, No. 53203/99, §§ 63 - 68, 15 December 2005).
24. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the final judgment by which the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been discontinued for want of corpus delicti, was quashed at the prosecution's request (see, by contrast, Fadin, cited above, § 34). The supervisory-instance court did not simply resume the proceedings, but remitted the case to the investigating authority for further investigation. Undoubtedly, that decision adversely affected the applicant's individual situation (see, by contrast, Nikitin, cited above, §§ 18 and 60).
25. The Court accepts that the supervisory review proceedings were initiated within a relatively short period of time. However, that factor alone is not sufficient to justify the quashing of the final judgment in the applicant's case. The Court does not accept the Government's argument that the supervisory review was aimed at the correction of the fundamental defect in the previous proceedings which might affect the outcome of the case. In that respect the Court has had regard to the reasoning of the reviewing court, which stated that the trial and appeal courts had not had at their disposal all relevant ministerial instructions and documents to decide the case (see paragraph 9 above).
26. In the Court's opinion, the mere consideration that the trial and appeal courts had not had regard to all relevant instructions cannot in itself, in the absence of jurisdictional errors or serious breaches of court procedure, abuses of power or any other weighty reasons stemming from the interests of justice, indicate the presence of a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings (see Radchikov v. Russia, No. 65582/01, § 48, 24 May 2007). Otherwise, the burden of the consequences of the a
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