Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is applicable where an action is "pecuniary" in nature and is founded on an alleged infringement of rights which are likewise pecuniary rights, notwithstanding the origin of the dispute (see, for example, Beaumartin v. France, judgment of 24 November 1994, Series A No. 296-B, p. 60 - 61, § 28).
40. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that as a consequence of making a deposit with the Bank the applicant received certain depository rights during the Bank's existence and on winding up of the Bank's business. Furthermore, the applicant's right to obtain repayment of the deposit, certain interest and compensation was confirmed by the final judgment. Decisions affecting the Bank's fate, such as a decision to rehabilitate the Bank and relieve it from payment of liabilities to its creditors in full, without any doubt, affected the applicant's rights as a creditor of the Bank, including his right to demand repayment of the judgment debt in full.
41. On 8 March 2001, under the terms of the friendly settlement agreement involving, inter alia, the Central Bank and the ARKO, the Bank was discharged from the obligation to repay its debts in full to its creditors, including those which were owed to the applicant. The Court notes in the first place that in his action against the Central Bank and the ARKO the applicant opposed the application of the terms of the friendly-settlement agreement to the Bank's liabilities as set before him, maintaining that he had not taken part in the friendly-settlement negotiations and that the agreement therefore violated his right to recover the judgment debt. He further claimed to have suffered economic loss as a result of the respondents' actions, for which he intended to seek compensation (see paragraph 18 above). In the opinion of the Court this clearly defined the proceedings, having regard to the context in which they were instituted and to the pecuniary nature of the applicant's claims, as a dispute over a "civil right" within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and Others and McElduff and Others v. the United Kingdom, 10 July 1998, § 61, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV).
42. Furthermore, the Court observes that the Government's objection to the applicability of Article 6 concerned a more peculiar aspect. They insisted that the proceedings at issue constituted a part of the enforcement proceedings pertaining to the judgment debt awarded to the applicant against the Bank and, thus, in the Government's opinion, Article 6 was inapplicable. Bearing in mind the finding in the previous paragraph and without accepting the Government's argument as to the essence of the proceedings at issue, the Court considers it worth reiterating its case-law to the effect that Article 6 applies to enforcement proceedings because, in the absence of the necessary measures to comply with a final, enforceable judicial decision, Article 6 § 1 can be deprived of all useful effect (see Hornsby v. Greece, judgment of 19 March 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II, §§ 41, 45; Silva Pontes v. Portugal, 23 March 1994, § 36, Series A No. 286-A and Lopatyuk and Others v. Ukraine, No. 903/05, § 14, 17 January 2008). The Court therefore dismisses the Government's objection as to the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention to the proceedings under consideration.
43. The Court further notes that the present complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
(b) Merits
44. The Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which declares, in
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