right to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial.
52. The only other ground for the applicant's continued detention was the District Court's brief reference to the applicant's "character", as typified by his lack of a permanent place of residence or employment in Moscow. The applicant consistently maintained that he lived and worked in Moscow on a permanent basis. It is not necessary for the Court to determine the applicant's residence and employment situation. Even assuming that he did not have a permanent place of residence in Moscow and was unemployed, the mere lack of a fixed residence or permanent employment does not give rise to a danger of absconding or reoffending (see Pshevecherskiy v. Russia, No. 28957/02, § 68, 24 May 2007). In the present case, the domestic courts did not point to any aspects of the applicant's character or behaviour that would justify their conclusion that he presented a persistent risk of absconding, reoffending or interfering with the proceedings. The applicant, on the other hand, constantly invoked the facts mitigating such risks. However, the domestic courts devoted no attention to discussion of the applicant's arguments that he had positive references, was in frail health and was the only breadwinner for his ailing spouse and a child. Nor did they address the fact that the applicant had not fled or interfered with the investigation during the year that had passed between the imputed events and his arrest, although he had had an opportunity to do so.
53. The Court notes the Government's argument that the applicant had been suspected of membership of an extremist organisation and had also been likely to communicate the details of the investigation to his accomplices. However, it is not the Court's task to assume the place of the national authorities who ruled on the applicant's detention and to supply its own analysis of facts arguing for or against detention (see Nikolov v. Bulgaria, No. 38884/97, § 74, 30 January 2003, and Labita, cited above, § 152). Those circumstances were referred to for the first time in the proceedings before the Court and the domestic courts never mentioned it in their decisions.
54. The Court further observes that after the case had been submitted for trial in July 2007 the trial court used the same summary formula to refuse the requests for release and extend the pre-trial detention of seven persons, without describing their personal situation in any detail. The Court has already found that the practice of issuing collective detention orders without a case-by-case assessment of the grounds for detention in respect of each detainee was incompatible, in itself, with Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Shcheglyuk v. Russia, No. 7649/02, § 45, 14 December 2006; Korchuganova, cited above, § 76; and Dolgova v. Russia, No. 11886/05, § 49, 2 March 2006). By extending the applicant's detention by means of collective detention orders the domestic authorities had no proper regard to his individual circumstances.
55. Finally, the Court notes that when deciding whether a person should be released or detained the authorities have an obligation under Article 5 § 3 to consider alternative measures of ensuring his or her appearance at trial. This Convention provision proclaims not only the right to "trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial" but also lays down that "release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial" (see Sulaoja v. Estonia, No. 55939/00, § 64 in fine, 15 February 2005, and {Jablonski}, cited above, § 83). In the present case the authorities never considered the possibility of ensuring the applicant's attendance by the use of a more lenient preventive measure, although he asked many times to be released on bail and provided the domestic courts with the personal surety of a member of Parliament.
56. The Court has frequen
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