aint needs not to be examined.
28. As to the judgment of 1 June 2006, its enforcement lasted one year: from the day this judgment became enforceable to the day the housing commission put the applicant in the queue. This period is compatible with the requirements of the Convention, especially since a part of the delay was caused by the applicant's failure to submit the necessary documents. Given the nature of the award, the authorities' requirement to submit these documents did not go beyond what is strictly necessary for the enforcement (see Akashev v. Russia, No. 30616/05, § 22, 12 June 2008).
29. There has, accordingly, been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
III. Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention
30. The applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that she had no effective domestic remedy against the delayed enforcement of the judgments. Article 13 reads as follows:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
A. Admissibility
31. The Government argued that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded because the Bailiff's Service had investigated the applicant's complaints.
32. The applicant maintained her complaint.
33. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
34. The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for a prolonged non-enforcement of a binding judgment (see, mutatis mutandis, {Kudla} v. Poland [GC], No. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR 2000-XI). With respect to the Court's finding that the prolonged non-enforcement did not in itself amount to a violation (see § 29 above), it should be noted that it suffices for Article 13 to be applicable that the applicant's claim that Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated, was arguable (see Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, 27 April 1988, § 54, Series A No. 131).
35. The Government have not specified how recourse to the criminal prosecution would provide preventive or compensatory relief against the non-enforcement. Nor have the Government given an example from domestic practice of a successful application of that remedy (see {Kudla}, cited above, § 159).
36. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 13.
IV. Alleged violation of Article 4 of the Convention
37. The applicant complained under Article 4 of the Convention that she had to continue to serve against her will awaiting the provision of the housing. Insofar as relevant, this Article reads as follows:
"2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3. For the purpose of this article the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include:
...
(b) any service of a military character. ..."
38. The Government argued that this complaint was inadmissible. The applicant's continuing service had been lawful under the domestic law, because the applicant had preferred to continue to serve awaiting the provision of the housing. The applicant maintained her complaint.
39. The Court notes that the applicant is a professional servicewoman who had joined the army voluntarily. It also notes that when asking for discharge the applicant had preferred to continue to serve awaiting the provision of the housing. In such circumstances, it is impossible to co
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