herefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
19. The Court reiterates that for the sake of legal certainty implicitly required by Article 6, final judgments should generally be left intact. They may be disturbed only to correct fundamental defects (see Ryabykh v. Russia, No. 52854/99, § 51 - 52, ECHR 2003-IX). To answer this complaint the Court will hence have to determine if the grounds for the quashing of the applicant's judgment fell within this exception (see Protsenko v. Russia, No. 13151/04, § 29, 31 July 2008).
20. In the case at hand, none of the grounds cited by the Presidium of the North-Caucasian Military Court were fundamental.
First, the trial court's approval of the settlement as reached by the parties conforms with the civil-law principle that parties are free to settle their case.
Second, the Service was represented by a high ranking officer who acted on the basis of a power of attorney given by the local branch of the Service. In those circumstances the officer had ostensible authority and there was nothing to indicate to the trial court that the requirements of representation of the defendant were not met. The responsibility lay with the Director who could have made other arrangements if he had so wished.
Third, the trial court's failure to formally record the acceptance of the claim was not a substantive shortcoming.
Fourth, misevaluation of facts and material law does not justify a quashing either (see Kot v. Russia, No. 20887/03, § 29, 18 January 2007).
21. As none of the grounds were based on a fundamental defect, the Court concludes that the Presidium was not justified to set the judgment aside. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account
of non-enforcement
22. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 about the delayed enforcement of the judgments. The Court finds it more appropriate to examine this complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only.
A. Admissibility
23. The Government argued that this complaint was inadmissible. The judgment of 15 March 2004 could not have been enforced because it had been quashed on supervisory review. The enforcement of the judgment of 1 June 2006 had been delayed by the applicant's failure to submit the necessary documents.
24. The applicant maintained her complaint. The authorities had not sought to enforce the judgment of 15 March 2004 while it had still been binding. It had been the applicant's unit, not the applicant herself, from whom the logistics department had requested the documents. Hence, she had not been responsible for the delayed submission of the documents.
25. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
26. The Court reiterates that an unreasonably long delay in the enforcement of a binding judgment may breach the Convention (see Burdov v. Russia, No. 59498/00, ECHR 2002-III). To decide if the delay was reasonable, the Court will look at how complex the enforcement proceedings were, how the applicant and the authorities behaved, and what the nature of the award was (see Raylyan v. Russia, No. 22000/03, § 31, 15 February 2007).
27. In the case at hand, with regard to the judgment of 15 March 2004, the Court considers that the issue of non-enforcement is absorbed by the issue of quashing, and hence this part of the compl
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