k and he therefore did not have the benefit of effective and confidential communication with her. He also complained that he had been deprived of the opportunity to participate in the appeal proceedings in person. In particular, the communication with the court by video link had been of poor quality and had not permitted him to effectively follow the proceedings and make his objections.
39. The Government, in their first set of observations, contended that the proceedings conducted by the Supreme Court on 31 October 2002 afforded the applicant sufficient guarantees of a fair trial, including the right to legal representation, and that his personal participation in the proceedings had been effectively ensured by the video link. As regards the use of the video link, the Government maintained that the use of this system of communication between the applicant and the court was, as such, compatible with Article 6 of the Convention and was justified in the circumstances of this case. They later amended their observations by informing the Court that on 4 July 2007 the Presidium of the Supreme Court had quashed the decision of 31 October 2002 on the grounds of a breach of the applicant's defence rights and therefore even if those criminal proceedings had involved a violation of Article 6, after the quashing the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of that violation. The Government made no submissions as regards the proceedings conducted after the supervisory review.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
40. The Court notes at the outset that the requirements of Article 6 § 3 are to be seen as particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1, and therefore the applicant's complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 should be examined together (see Vacher v. France, 17 December 1996, § 22, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI).
41. The Court reiterates that while Article 6 § 3 (c) confers on everyone charged with a criminal offence the right to "defend himself in person or through legal assistance...", it does not specify the manner of exercising this right. It thus leaves to the Contracting States the choice of the means of ensuring that it is secured in their judicial systems, the Court's task being only to ascertain whether the method they have chosen is consistent with the requirements of a fair trial (see Quaranta v. Switzerland, 24 May 1991, § 30, Series A No. 205). In that connection it must be borne in mind that the Convention is intended to "guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective" and that assigning a counsel does not in itself ensure the effectiveness of the assistance he may afford an accused (see Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, § 38, Series A No. 275, and Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A No. 37).
42. The Court also reiterates that a person charged with a criminal offence should, as a general principle based on the notion of a fair trial, be entitled to be present at the first-instance trial hearing. However, the attendance of the defendant in person does not necessarily take on the same significance for the appeal hearing. Indeed, even where an appellate court has full jurisdiction to review the case on questions of both fact and law, Article 6 does not always entail a right to be present in person. Regard must be had in assessing this question to, inter alia, the special features of the proceedings involved and the manner in which the defence's interests are presented and protected before the appellate court, particularly in the light of the issues to be decided by it and their importance for the appellant (see Helmers v. Sweden, 29 October 1991, §§ 31 - 32, Series A No. 212-A; Belziuk v. Poland, 25 March 1998, § 37, Reports 1998-II; Pobornikoff v. Austria, No. 28501/95, § 24, 3 October 20
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