R 1999-VI). While the authorities in the present case indeed acknowledged a violation of the applicant's rights in the first set of re-trial, the Court considers that the second set of re-trial was insufficient by itself to eliminate the adverse effects of the quashed decisions, but that the notion of "redress" required some form of tangible compensation. It notes that the applicant served six months in excess of his original prison sentence. In the absence of any submissions by the parties concerning the possible avenues provided for in the domestic law for claiming compensation in respect of these periods, the Court cannot but observe that, as matters stand, no compensation has been paid to the applicant for the violation of the applicant's right in the first trial. In such circumstances it concludes that the criminal proceedings against the applicant, taken as a whole, did not satisfy the requirements of a "fair hearing" guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.
38. As regards the applicability of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to supervisory-review proceedings, in the Nikitin case cited above the Court found as follows:
"46. The Court notes that the Russian legislation in force at the material time permitted a criminal case in which a final decision had been given to be reopened on the grounds of new or newly discovered evidence or a fundamental defect (Articles 384 - 390 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). This procedure obviously falls within the scope of Article 4 § 2 of Protocol No. 7. However, the Court notes that, in addition, a system also existed which allowed the review of a case on the grounds of a judicial error concerning points of law and procedure (supervisory review, Articles 371 - 383 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The subject matter of such proceedings remained the same criminal charge and the validity of its previous determination. If the request was granted and the proceedings were resumed for further consideration, the ultimate effect of supervisory review would be to annul all decisions previously taken by courts and to determine the criminal charge in a new decision. To this extent, the effect of supervisory review is the same as reopening, because both constitute a form of continuation of the previous proceedings. The Court therefore concludes that for the purposes of the ne bis in idem principle supervisory review may be regarded as a special type of reopening falling within the scope of Article 4 § 2 of Protocol No. 7."
39. The Court observes that the judgment of 29 September 1997 of the Kuntsevskiy District Court of Moscow, which became final after the applicant's appeal was rejected by the Moscow City Court on 27 November 1997, had been quashed on the grounds of serious procedural defects and that the case was reconsidered by two judicial instances, which delivered the final judgment. The latter judgment was subsequently quashed, also on the grounds of a serious procedural violation. As in the Nikitin case and other cases cited above, the subject matter of the new sets of proceedings consisted of the same criminal charge and the validity of its previous determination. Having regard to the above findings, the Court concludes that the supervisory review in the instant case constituted a reopening of the case owing to a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, within the meaning of Article 4 § 2 of Protocol No. 7. Accordingly, the complaint raises no issues under Article 4 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 separate from that under Article 6 of the Convention (see Bratyakin, cited above, and Savinskiy v. Ukraine (dec.), No. 6965/02, 31 May 2005).
40. Therefore, the Court finds a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and finds that the applicant's complaints raise no separate issue under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.
II. Application of Article 41 of the Convention
41. Article 41
> 1 2 3 ... 12 13 14