peatedly withdrawn the writ of execution concerning the judgment of 17 April 2003 and consecutively sent it to different authorities. The judgment of 4 December 2003 was enforced only six months after its rectification on 9 March 2006. Finally, the judgment of 24 March 2006 was enforced in two steps: on 2 November 2006 in its major part and on 17 August 2007 for the remainder, i.e. only nine months after the partial execution.
50. The Government lastly referred to the complexity of the enforcement proceedings in this case given that several judgments were involved. They also emphasised objective circumstances, such as the complexity of the federal multilevel budgetary system and legislative changes, which had led to delays in enforcement for which the Government were not responsible.
2. The applicant
51. The applicant submitted that he had complained before different State authorities including the Ministry of Finance, Federal Treasury, prosecutor's office and bailiffs about insufficient regular payments and/or delays in enforcement of judgments in his favour. In his view, the State authorities should also have displayed diligence in this respect, but had failed to take the necessary action. He considered that the surprisingly short delays in the execution of the judgments of 22 May 2007 and 21 August 2007 were presumably a result of the Court's decision to communicate his application to the Government.
52. As regards the other three judgments, the applicant disagreed with the Government's calculation of the delays. He argued that an overall 31-month delay in the execution of the judgment of 17 April 2003 was imputable to various authorities; the writ of execution concerning the judgment of 4 December 2003 had remained for 21 months with the Shakhty Directorate of Labour and Social Development without any action being taken, before it applied to the court for correction of an arithmetic error; the judgment of 24 March 2006 remained unenforced, albeit in part, until August 2007. The applicant concluded that he was still a victim of violations of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Admissibility
53. The Court notes that the Government have explicitly dropped their objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant and will not examine this question.
54. As regards the applicant's victim status, the Court recalls that under Article 34 of the Convention, "the Court may receive applications from any person ... claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto ...".
55. It falls first to the national authorities to redress any alleged violation of the Convention. In this regard, the question whether or not the applicant can claim to be a victim of the violation alleged is relevant at all stages of the proceedings under the Convention (see Burdov, cited above, § 30).
56. The Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant, such as the enforcement of a judgment after substantial delay, is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a "victim", unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see Petrushko v. Russia, No. 36494/02, §§ 14 - 16, 24 February 2005, with further references). Redress so afforded must be appropriate and sufficient, failing which a party can continue to claim to be a victim of the violation (see Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) [GC], No. 36813/97, § 181, ECHR 2006-..., and Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], No. 64886/01, § 72, ECHR 2006-...).
57. The Government argued that domestic courts granted the applicant compensation for delays in e
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