nforcement of the judgments in his favour by way of indexation of the initial awards under Article 208 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The applicant did not contest this fact, but argued that he retained the status of a victim. The Court has thus to consider whether the indexation awards amount to an acknowledgement of the violations of the Convention and constitute appropriate and sufficient redress in this respect.
58. The Court notes on the first point that the decisions referred to by the Government did not explicitly acknowledge violations of the Convention. They awarded compensation on the basis of an objective fact that a certain time had elapsed between the moment when the sums were due and the moment when they were paid. The question would thus arise of whether these decisions acknowledged the alleged violations in substance. However, the Court does not consider it necessary to rule on this issue, given its conclusion below as to whether redress granted was adequate and sufficient.
59. On the latter point, the Court observes that Article 208 of the Code of Civil Procedure only allows the courts to upgrade the amounts awarded in line with an official price index, thus compensating for depreciation of the national currency. The compensation so awarded thus covered only inflation-related losses but not any further damage sustained by the applicant, either pecuniary or non-pecuniary. The Government did not provide any argument to the contrary. The Court has already considered the issue in other cases concerning Russia and concluded that compensation for inflation losses alone, however accessible and effective in law and practice, does not constitute the adequate and sufficient redress required by the Convention (see Moroko v. Russia, No. 20937/07, § 27, 12 June 2008). As to the earlier decisions quoted by the Government (see paragraph 48 above), the Court reaffirms that they were taken in the specific circumstances of these individual cases (see Moroko, cited above, § 26) and must not be interpreted as establishing any general principle that would contradict the Court's present conclusion.
60. The Court accordingly concludes that the applicant was not granted adequate and sufficient redress in respect of the alleged violations and can thus still claim to be a victim under Article 34 of the Convention. The Government objection must therefore be dismissed.
61. As regards other arguments submitted by the parties, the Court notes that they raise serious questions that require consideration on the merits. The Court accordingly considers that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
62. It is not disputed by the parties that the five judgments concerned by the present case were fully enforced but with certain delays. The only issue to be decided by the Court is whether these delays violated the Convention.
63. The parties disagreed on this point at least with regard to three of the five judgments: the Government considered that the delays were up to ten months and were in conformity with the Convention; the applicant considered the delays to be much longer and, therefore, in breach of the Convention.
64. Given these diverging positions, the Court considers it appropriate to recall and clarify the main principles established by its case-law that must guide the determination of the relevant issues under the Convention.
(a) General principles
65. The right to a court protected by Article 6 would be illusory if a Contracting State's domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party. Execution of a judgment given by any court must therefore be regarded as an integral part of the "tria
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