l" for the purposes of Article 6 (see Hornsby v. Greece, 19 March 1997, § 40, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II).
66. An unreasonably long delay in enforcement of a binding judgment may therefore breach the Convention (see Burdov v. Russia, No. 59498/00, ECHR 2002-III). The reasonableness of such delay is to be determined having regard in particular to the complexity of the enforcement proceedings, the applicant's own behaviour and that of the competent authorities, and the amount and nature of the court award (see Raylyan v. Russia, No. 22000/03, § 31, 15 February 2007).
67. While the Court has due regard to the domestic statutory time-limits set for enforcement proceedings, their non-respect does not automatically amount to a breach of the Convention. Some delay may be justified in particular circumstances but it may not, in any event, be such as to impair the essence of the right protected under Article 6 § 1 (see Burdov, cited above, § 35). Thus, the Court considered, for example, in a recent case concerning Russia, that an overall delay of nine months taken by the authorities to enforce a judgment was not prima facie unreasonable under the Convention (see Moroko, cited above, § 43). Such an assumption does not, however, obviate the need for an assessment in the light of the aforementioned criteria (see paragraph 66 above) and having regard to other relevant circumstances (see Moroko, cited above, §§ 44 - 45).
68. A person who has obtained a judgment against the State may not be expected to bring separate enforcement proceedings (see Metaxas v. Greece, No. 8415/02, § 19, 27 May 2004). In such cases, the defendant State authority must be duly notified of the judgment and is thus well placed to take all necessary initiatives to comply with it or to transmit it to another competent State authority responsible for execution. This is particularly relevant in a situation where, in view of the complexities and possible overlapping of the execution and enforcement procedures, an applicant may have reasonable doubts about which authority is responsible for the execution or enforcement of the judgment (see Akashev v. Russia, No. 30616/05, § 21, 12 June 2008).
69. A successful litigant may be required to undertake certain procedural steps in order to recover the judgment debt, be it during a voluntary execution of a judgment by the State or during its enforcement by compulsory means (see Shvedov v. Russia, No. 69306/01, § 29 - 37, 20 October 2005). Accordingly, it is not unreasonable that the authorities request the applicant to produce additional documents, such as bank details, to allow or speed up the execution of a judgment (see, mutatis mutandis, Kosmidis and Kosmidou v. Greece, No. 32141/04, § 24, 8 November 2007). The requirement of the creditor's cooperation must not, however, go beyond what is strictly necessary and, in any event, does not relieve the authorities of their obligation under the Convention to take timely action of their own motion, on the basis of the information available to them, with a view to honouring the judgment against the State (see Akashev, cited above, § 22). The Court thus considers that the burden to ensure compliance with a judgment against the State lies primarily with the State authorities starting from the date on which the judgment becomes binding and enforceable.
70. The complexity of the domestic enforcement procedure or of the State budgetary system cannot relieve the State of its obligation under the Convention to guarantee to everyone the right to have a binding and enforceable judicial decision enforced within a reasonable time. Nor is it open to a State authority to cite the lack of funds or other resources (such as housing) as an excuse for not honouring a judgment debt (see Burdov, cited above, § 35, and Kukalo v. Russia, No. 63995/00, § 49, 3 November 2005). It is for the Contracting States to organise their legal s
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