w the case on questions of both fact and law. Regard must be had in assessing this question to, inter alia, the special features of the proceedings involved and the manner in which the defence's interests are presented and protected before the appellate court, particularly in the light of the issues to be decided by it and their importance for the appellant (see Belziuk v. Poland, 25 March 1998, § 37, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-II).
60. It is also of crucial importance for the fairness of the criminal justice system that the accused be adequately defended, both at first-instance and on appeal (see Lala v. the Netherlands, 22 September 1994, § 33, Series A No. 297-A).
61. The principle of equality of arms is only one feature of the wider concept of a fair trial, which also includes the fundamental right that criminal proceedings should be adversarial. The latter means, in a criminal case, that both prosecution and defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other party (see Brandstetter v. Austria, 28 August 1991, §§ 66 and 67, Series A No. 211).
(b) Application of the above principles to the instant case
62. The Court would note at the outset that it does not consider it necessary to decide whether the lack of participation of the applicant and his counsel, taken separately, would render the proceedings before the supervisory review court unfair. Neither of them was present before the Presidium of the Supreme Court or could make prior submissions, and it is against this background that the Court will determine the complaint in issue.
63. The Court observes that the supervisory review proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960 were different from "ordinary" appeal proceedings in that, among other things, the power to initiate these proceedings was vested with certain senior judicial and prosecution officers, and not the parties.
64. The fact remains, however, that the supervisory review instance was not bound by the scope of the request for supervisory review and could carry out a full scale judicial review of the decisions in the case by either quashing or amending them, remitting the case to lower courts or an investigator, or terminating the criminal proceedings partly or altogether (see Relevant Domestic Law above, paragraph 44). Even though in the end the applicant's sentence remained unchanged, the Presidium of the Supreme Court did exercise its power by amending the conviction and thereby determining a criminal charge against him (see paragraphs 13 and 14 in the facts section and paragraphs 56 and 57 above).
65. Having regard to the above and the fact that the supervisory review proceedings were initiated on the prosecution's request, the Court considers that in order to satisfy the principle of fairness enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention the Presidium of the Supreme Court should have notified the applicant and his defence lawyer of the contents of the prosecution's supervisory review request and the date and place of the hearing. And since the prosecution was later present at the supervisory review hearing of 18 October 2000 and made submissions, the principle of adversarial proceedings also required that the defence be present at that hearing in order to be able to contest and comment on the arguments advanced by the prosecution. In these circumstances, the Court rejects as irrelevant the Government's reference to the fact that the absence of the applicant and his counsel from the hearing was not unlawful under domestic law.
66. The Court finds the above considerations sufficient to conclude that the proceedings before the Presidium of the Supreme Court did not comply with the requirements of fairness.
67. There has therefore been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
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