Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 30.03.2009 "Дело "Леже (Leger) против Франции" [рус., англ.]

taking refuge behind his alleged innocence, but considered "that Mr {Leger's} conduct [did] not, after 41 years of imprisonment, represent an obstacle to his release on licence as it might have done in the past". Lastly, they noted that the risk of his reoffending was limited ("a zero risk of reoffending is so rare") and that the recent expert reports were generally in favour of his release on licence. The Post-sentencing Court therefore concluded by noting that there was no cause to expect a more positive development in the applicant's case, and that a refusal of his application for release on licence would amount to his virtually permanent exclusion from society, which did not appear justified in view of his resettlement plan and the limited nature of the risk of his reoffending. On 3 October 2005 the applicant was indeed released.
41. On 17 November 2006 a follow-up report on the applicant, giving an assessment of the first year following his release on licence, was submitted by social workers. In their conclusions they referred, among other things, to an improvement in his health and to genuine progress in terms of personal autonomy. They noted that there had been no change in his statements regarding his innocence and his desire to make it known. While observing that the applicant was meeting his obligations, they expressed the view that he did not accept them in that he disputed the legitimacy of the obligation not to comment on the events, continually argued that the meetings with the psychiatrist were of no use and regarded the social workers' intervention as a restriction of his liberty.

THE LAW

42. The Court observes that Article 37 § 1 of the Convention provides:
"The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that
(a) the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or
(b) the matter has been resolved; or
(c) for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application.
However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires."
43. It also notes that in a number of cases in which an applicant died in the course of the proceedings it has taken into account the statements of the applicant's heirs or of close family members expressing the wish to pursue the proceedings (see Deweer v. Belgium, 27 February 1980, §§ 37 - 38, Series A No. 35; X v. the United Kingdom, 5 November 1981, § 32, Series A No. 46; Vocaturo v. Italy, 24 May 1991, § 2, Series A No. 206-C; G. v. Italy, 27 February 1992, § 2, Series A No. 228-F; Pandolfelli and Palumbo v. Italy, 27 February 1992, § 2, Series A No. 231-B; X v. France, 31 March 1992, § 26, Series A No. 234-C; and Raimondo v. Italy, 22 February 1994, § 2, Series A No. 281-A), or the existence of a legitimate interest claimed by a person wishing to pursue the application (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], No. 33071/96, ECHR 2000-XII).
44. On the other hand, it has been the Court's practice to strike applications out of the list of cases in the absence of any heir or close relative who has expressed the wish to pursue an application (see, among other authorities, Scherer v. Switzerland, 25 March 1994, §§ 31 - 32, Series A No. 287; {Ohlinger} v. Austria, No. 21444/93, Commission's report of 14 January 1997, § 15; and {Thevenon} v. France (dec.), No. 2476/02, ECHR 2006-III).
45. In the instant case the applicant was found dead at his home on 18 July 2008. The Court was informed of this by the media and not by the applicant's lawyer, Mr de Felice, who himself died on 27 July 2008.
46. On 11 August 2008 Ms I. Terrel stated that she w

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