had retained his victim status.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Admissibility
119. As regards the Government's argument which related to the fact that the criminal proceedings against the police officers were pending, the Court observes that after this argument was raised the criminal proceedings were completed by a final judgment convicting the police officers. Accordingly, the Court does not find it necessary to examine the Government's objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, as it has lost its rationale (see, for similar reasoning, Samoylov v. Russia, No. 64398/01, § 39, 2 October 2008).
120. As regards compliance with the six-month rule, the Court reiterates that normally the six-month period runs from the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], Nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, § 157, ECHR 2009-...). In the present case the final decision was given after the lodging of the application, therefore at the time it was lodged the six-month period had not yet started to run. The Government's objection as to non-compliance with the six-month rule is therefore without merit.
121. Further, the Court considers that the question whether the applicant may still claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of his alleged ill-treatment is closely linked to the question whether the investigation of the events in question was effective and also whether the compensation which the applicant received was sufficient. However, these issues relate to the merits of the applicant's complaints under Article 3 of the Convention (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, No. 41461/02, § 53, 24 July 2008). The Court therefore decides to join this matter to the merits.
122. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
(a) Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant
123. As the Court has stated on many occasions, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Labita v. Italy [GC], No. 26772/95, § 120, ECHR 2000-IV). Treatment has been held by the Court to be "inhuman" because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering, and also "degrading" because it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them. In order for a punishment or treatment associated with it to be "inhuman" or "degrading", the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. The question whether the purpose of the treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a further factor to be taken into account, but the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 24888/94, § 71, ECHR 1999-IX).
124. Further, in order to determine whether a particular form of ill-treatment should be qualified as torture, the Court must have regard to the distinction, embodied in Article 3, between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. It appears that it was the intention that the Convention sh
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