ould, by means of this distinction, attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering. The Court has previously had before it cases in which it has found that there has been treatment which could only be described as torture (see Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, § 64, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI; {Aydin} v. Turkey, 25 September 1997, §§ 83 - 84 and 86, Reports 1997-VI; Selmouni v. France [GC], No. 25803/94, § 105, ECHR 1999-V; Dikme v. Turkey, No. 20869/92, §§ 94 - 96, ECHR 2000-VIII; and, in respect of Russia, Menesheva v. Russia, No. 59261/00, §§ 60 - 62, ECHR 2006-...; Mikheyev v. Russia, No. 77617/01, § 135, 26 January 2006; and Polonskiy v. Russia, No. 30033/05, § 124, 19 March 2009).
125. In the present case the domestic courts acknowledged that between January and April 2001 the applicant had been repeatedly ill-treated by the police officers of Dolgorukovskoe police station and had sustained numerous injuries. In particular, it was established that the police officers had punched and kicked the applicant, hit his heels with truncheons, subjected him to electric shocks, put a gas mask on him and closed the air vent or forced him to inhale cigarette smoke through the vent, tied his hands behind his back and suspended him in the air by means of a rope, jumped on his chest and stomach, threatened to rape and shoot him, attempted to strangle him, spat at him, and forced him to undress and to kneel in front of a photograph of the policeman of whose murder he had been suspected and apologise for killing him. That treatment had caused him severe mental and physical suffering and resulted in grave injuries, such as brain oedema, post-traumatic displacement of two ribs, post-traumatic hearing impairment, deformation of both feet and shoulder-blade deformation, as well as in a general brain dysfunction and a chronic psychiatric disorder. The applicant had sustained very serious and irreversible damage to his health. It was also established that the use of force had been aimed at debasing the applicant, driving him into submission and making him confess to a criminal offence which he had not committed (see paragraphs 74, 77 and 78 above).
126. Given the purpose, length and intensity of the ill-treatment and the particularly serious health damage caused by it, the Court concludes that it amounted to torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.
(b) The issue of victim status
127. In paragraph 121 above the Court found that the question whether the applicant might still claim to be a victim in respect of the treatment sustained at the hands of the police was closely linked to the question whether the investigation into the events at issue had been effective and whether the compensation received by the applicant had been sufficient. It thus decided to join the issue of the applicant's victim status to the merits and will examine it now.
128. The Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a "victim" unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, for example, Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, § 36, Reports 1996-III, and Dalban v. Romania [GC], No. 28114/95, § 44, ECHR 1999-VI).
129. In the present case the domestic authorities expressly acknowledged that the applicant had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 77 above). It remains to be ascertained whether he was afforded appropriate and sufficient redress for the breach of his rights under the Convention.
130. The Court reiterates that, in the case of a breach of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention, compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage flowing from the breach should in principle be ava
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