the final decision in her case. However, the Court reiterates that only those periods when the case was actually pending before the domestic courts, that is, the periods when there was no effective judgment in the determination of the merits of the applicant's dispute and when the authorities were under an obligation to pass such a judgment, should be taken into account (see, for example Skorobogatova v. Russia, No. 33914/02, § 39, 1 December 2005, with further references). Therefore, the proceedings were pending during the following periods:
(a) between 17 July and 18 September 2001 (2 months and 2 days);
(b) between 25 November 2002 and 8 August 2003 (8 months and 12 days);
(c) between 7 October 2005 and 4 April 2006 (5 months and 27 days);
(d) and between 17 October 2007 and 6 May 2008 (6 months and 19 days).
41. Taking into account the above, the Court considers that the period to be considered is approximately one year and eleven months. During that period the domestic court examined the case in six rounds at two levels of jurisdiction.
2. Reasonableness of the length of proceedings
42. The Government considered that the domestic courts examined the applicant's claim within a reasonable time. The applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings by amending her claims and lodging motions. On one occasion the case was adjourned because the applicant and her child were sick. The proceedings were also adjourned several times at the defendant's requests. The courts examined the case several times. The proceedings were delayed by the referral of the case to a different court; however, that had been at the applicant's request.
43. The applicant considered that the proceedings were not conducted promptly. Firstly, for a long period of time her claim was examined by courts which were not impartial and independent, despite her requests to refer her case to different courts. It was not until 7 October 2005 that the Supreme Court acknowledged that the courts which had dealt with her case could not be considered impartial and independent and referred the case to a court in a different region. Secondly, significant delays in the proceedings were caused by the poor quality of the court decisions. The domestic courts had repeatedly adopted unlawful decisions in her case and had not followed the instructions given by the higher courts.
44. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], No. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). Furthermore, special diligence is necessary in employment disputes (Ruotolo v. Italy, 27 February 1992, Series A No. 230-D, p. 39, § 17).
45. The Court considers that the applicant's case was not complex.
46. As to the applicant's conduct, the Court is not convinced by the Government's argument that the applicant should be held responsible for amending her claims and lodging motions. It has been the Court's constant approach that an applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded by the national law in the defence of his interests (see, mutatis mutandis, {Yagci} and {Sargin} v. Turkey, 8 June 1995, Series A No. 319-A, § 66). It is not disputed that the applicant asked to adjourn the proceedings on some occasions. However, the resulting delay was insignificant. Therefore, she cannot be held responsible for any substantial delays in the proceedings.
47. Regarding the conduct of domestic authorities, the Court observes that the domestic courts examined the case in six rou
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