own in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ..."
26. The proceedings commenced in 1995, when the applicant lodged her claim with the Town Court. However, the Court has competence ratione temporis to examine only the period after 5 May 1998, when the Convention entered into force in respect of Russia. In assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the state of proceedings at the time. Furthermore, only those periods when the case was actually pending before the domestic courts, that is the periods when there was no effective judgment in the determination of the merits of the applicant's dispute and when the authorities were under an obligation to pass such a judgment, should be taken into account (see, for example, Skorobogatova v. Russia, No. 33914/02, § 39, 1 December 2005 with further references). In the present case the proceedings were pending from 13 January 1999, when the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 10 October 1997, until 16 March 2004, when the Regional Court adopted a final decision in the case. Taking into account the above, the period to be considered is approximately five years and two months. During that period the case was examined three times at two levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
27. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
28. The Government firstly argued that the case was particularly complex. The proceedings were adjourned several times in order to call experts and third parties to the hearing, three times at the applicant's request to give her time to amend her claims and gather evidence, and three times at the respondent's request. Moreover, the respondent had been reorganised in the course of the proceedings and the courts had had to establish its legal successor. The Government further claimed that the case was adjourned five times because of the applicant's failure to appear, which resulted in four months' delay. On 11 April 2002 the claim was left unexamined because the applicant failed to appear at two hearings. The applicant did not appeal against that decision, but requested that the proceedings be resumed only on 16 January 2003. As a result, the proceedings were delayed by nine months. The domestic courts conducted the proceedings properly. The hearings were scheduled at regular intervals. Only on two occasions was the case adjourned because the judge was on sick leave and was busy in unrelated proceedings. The case was examined several times. The decisions of lower courts were quashed because the case involved complex legal issues and facts, but not because of serious mistakes committed by judges.
29. The applicant's main argument was that the domestic courts had not conducted the proceedings properly. On 13 January 1999 the Presidium of the Regional Court should have decided her case, instead of sending the case for a fresh examination.
30. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], No. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
31. The Court is ready to agree with the Government that the proceedings at issue were of a certain complexity. However, the Court cann
> 1 2 3 ... 8 9 10 11 ... 12