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Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 26.03.2009 "Дело "Елизаров (Yelizarov) против Российской Федерации" [рус., англ.]





e accused must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continued detention ceases to be reasonable. A person charged with an offence must always be released pending trial unless the State can show that there are "relevant and sufficient" reasons to justify the continued detention (see, among other authorities, Castravet v. Moldova, No. 23393/05, §§ 30 and 32, 13 March 2007; McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 543/03, § 41, ECHR 2006-...; {Jablonski} v. Poland, No. 33492/96, § 83, 21 December 2000; and Neumeister v. Austria, 27 June 1968, § 4, Series A No. 8). Article 5 § 3 of the Convention cannot be seen as unconditionally authorising detention provided that it lasts no longer than a certain period. Justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities (see Shishkov v. Bulgaria, No. 38822/97, § 66, ECHR 2003-I (extracts)).
45. It is incumbent on the domestic authorities to establish the existence of specific facts relevant to the grounds for continued detention. Shifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the Convention, a provision which makes detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty and one that is only permissible in exhaustively enumerated and strictly defined cases (see Rokhlina v. Russia, No. 54071/00, § 67, 7 April 2005, and Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, No. 33977/96, §§ 84 - 85, 26 July 2001). The national judicial authorities must examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty, and must set them out in their decisions dismissing the applications for release. It is not the Court's task to establish such facts or to take the place of the national authorities who ruled on the applicant's detention. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in the domestic courts' decisions and of the true facts mentioned by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Korchuganova v. Russia, No. 75039/01, § 72, 8 June 2006; Ilijkov, cited above, § 86; and Labita, cited above, § 152).
(b) Application to the present case
46. The applicant was arrested on 11 April 2007. On 24 March 2008 the trial court convicted him as charged. Thus, the period to be taken into consideration lasted slightly less than a year.
47. Although the applicant denied having participated in any criminal activity, the Court notes that witnesses identified him as one of the perpetrators of the assault. It accepts therefore that his detention could have initially been warranted by a reasonable suspicion of his involvement in the commission of a criminal offence. It remains to be ascertained whether the judicial authorities gave "relevant" and "sufficient" grounds to justify the applicant's continued detention and whether they displayed "special diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings.
48. The judicial authorities relied, in addition to the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, on the risk of his absconding, reoffending or obstructing the course of justice. In this respect they referred to the gravity of the charge, the absence of a registered place of residence or permanent employment in Moscow, his record of administrative offences, and the fact that the imputed offence had been committed by an organised group.
49. The gravity of the charge was the main factor in the assessment of the applicant's potential to abscond, reoffend or obstruct the course of justice. The Court has repeatedly held that, although the severity of the s



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