imes, including twice following a reopening by way of supervisory review. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that the procedure for reopening proceedings in 2005 was set in motion by the applicant. The Court reiterates, however, the principle according to which an applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded to the defence by national law (see {Yagci} and {Sargin} v. Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A No. 319-A, § 66). The same applied to the supervisory-review procedure, although it is not normally taken into consideration as a remedy under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Berdzenishvili v. Russia (dec.), No. 31697/03, ECHR 2004-II (extracts)). Although the mere possibility of reopening a criminal case is prima facie compatible with Article 6 of the Convention, the Convention requires that the authorities allow the resumption of criminal proceedings only if serious legitimate considerations outweigh the principle of legal certainty (see Bratyakin v. Russia (dec.), No. 72776/01, 9 March 2006). Once such a reopening is allowed, the ensuing proceedings should be completed within a "reasonable time", regard being had to all pertinent factors (see, mutatis mutandis, Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 15007/02, § 74, 7 December 2006, and Henworth v. the United Kingdom, No. 515/02, § 29, 2 November 2004).
28. Although the Court is not in a position to analyse the juridical quality of the domestic courts' decisions, it considers that, since the remittal of cases for re-examination is frequently ordered as a result of errors committed by lower courts, the repetition of such orders within one set of proceedings may disclose a serious deficiency in the judicial system (see Wierciszewska v. Poland, No. 41431/98, § 46, 25 November 2003; Yurtayev v. Ukraine, No. 11336/02, § 41, 31 January 2006; Matica v. Romania, No. 19567/02, § 24, 2 November 2006; and Maruseva v. Russia, No. 28602/02, § 32, 29 May 2008). It is incumbent on respondent States to organise their legal systems in such a way that their courts can meet the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, including the obligation to hear cases within a reasonable time (see {Surmeli} v. Germany [GC], No. 75529/01, § 129, 8 June 2006).
29. Thus, although the overall length of the proceedings was not particularly long, the Court considers that the "reasonable time" requirement was not complied with, having regard to the circumstances of the case, in particular the applicant's age at the relevant time and the re-examination of the case on several occasions. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. Other alleged violations of the Convention
30. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that in 1998 the police officers had beaten him up and forced him to confess. He further complained, under Article 6 § 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention, about the restrictions on his right to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choice. He also complained, under Article 6 § 3 (d), of the Convention that the court did not hear the defence witnesses until two years after the criminal proceedings had been instituted.
31. The Court has examined those complaints, as submitted by the applicant. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. Application of Article 41 of the Convention
32. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
"If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if t
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